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LOCKE READING
THE LAW OF NATURE
Lockeian Hermeneutics
and
Political Judgment
Andrew Norris

And hence we see that, in the interpretation of Laws,
whether Divine or Humane, there is no end; Comments
beget Comments, and Explications make new matter for
Explications: And of limiting, distinguishing, varying
the signification of these moral Words, there is no end.
John Locke
I^B^^hat the problem of judgment lies at the center of Locke's
political theory is commonly recognized. Locke himself
announces as much in the Two Treatises of Government by
identifying the constitution of civil society with the establishment of
a common judge.' In thus seeing the problem of politics as emeiging
' "Want of a common Judge with Authority, puts all men in a State of Nature' (Locke,
Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett [Cambridge; Cambridge University, 1963], II, §19).
All further references to the Treatises will be included in the text and cited by treatise and
section number.
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from the diversity of private judgment Locke is at one with his fellow
contract theorists: reflecting the decisive impact of modern skepticism
upon their political thought, Hobbes, Spinoza, Rousseau, and Kant all
identify the state of nature with the lack of a public, authoritative
judge.^ On Locke's account such a judge gains the power and
authority to end civil strife by assuming the right to enforce the law
of nature—a right that had hitherto Iain with all men, and therefore
was itself constantly in dariger of being drawn into their arguments.
Locke's political theory in turn seeks to outline the criteria by which
the citizenry are meant to judge that judge, to ascertain whether his
pronouncements are just as well as expedient. However, the
identificadon of the criteria by which the populace and the political
theorist identify impartial judgment does not in itself explain how
judgment functions or bow impartiality is possible. So, for instance,
the fact that a political jtidgment is legitimated by the support of the
majority does npt in itself help us to answer either of these questions.
Indeed, giyen the central role played by thjs public judgnient, it is
surprising to note the paucity of Locke's analyses of its function-'
The Treatises dp not contain any systematic discussion of judgment,
while the ^sa,y Concerning Human Understanding merely follows
^ Compare: Hpbbes, Leviathan (New York: Penguin, 1968), 11 and 216; Spinoza, "A
Theological-Political Treatise," in A Theological Treatise and A Political Treatise (New York:
Dover, 1951), 200-03; Rousseau, The Social Contract (New York: Pen^in, 1968), 60-61; and
Kant, The Metaphysical plements of Justice (New Yorjt: Macmdlan, 198^, Th. Fpr the relation
of skepticism TO contract theory, see Richard Tuck, Hobbes (Oxford: Oxford University,
(989), which argues that Hobbes's state of natijre iri particular is distingiiished from that of
Grotius by his acceptance of the implications of the skepucal argiinients advanced by
Monwigne and Lipsius. In Hobbes's view, if moral and religious coricpr4 cannot be assumed
as the basis of the state, such concord must be produced by h- As in Machiavelli, politics
assunaes a logical priority oyer paorality—which has the disturbing iinplication of loosing
politics ftorn morality's rule.
' Ruth Grant argues persuasively that the study of Locke's Of the Conduct of the
Understanding allows us to draw out a model of govertitrient as )ti4ge in which procedural
and institutional features—such as the presence pf a consdtutiori and the absence of strong
political parties—encoprages just and impartial judgment. But in so far a^ the possibility of
impartial deliberations on the part pf an individual are concerned, Grapt can glean from
Lpcke oply the criterion that an individual mtrst not have made tip hef mind before the
legislative prpcess begins. See Grant,/oin Locke's Liberalism (Chicago: University of Chicago,
198:^, 180-92;
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Hobbes in distinguishing between two species of judgment: the
synthetic faculty of wit and the analytic faculty of judgment proper/
The justification of political judgment is not a matter to be
determined entirely by consensus, though in his more populist moods
Locke can make the social compact assume such a guise. It is also a
function of the judgment's conformity with the law of nature;
indeed, this last would appear to be the ground for the consensus that
presumably attends the just judgment; "the Municipal Laws of
Countries...are only so far right, as they are founded on the Law of
Nature, by which they are to be regulated and interpreted" (II, 12).
A number of his readers have aigued that Locke's treatment of
natural law differs from those of his predecessors Nicole and Bayle by
virtue of his retreat from the pursuit of a secular social science to an
intrinsically religious approach to politics.^ But the status of Locke's
law of nature is less clear than that would imply. He is drawn to both
a hedonist identification of the law wkh the will of God and a
rationalist identification of the law with reason, and he does not
manage to reconcile the two in a finally satisfactory manner.^
Neither, however, can be discarded: As a law the law pf nature is
incomprehensible "without a Law-maker, or without Reward and
' Locke, The pssay concerning Human Understanding, ej. Peter Nidditch (New York:
Clarendon, 1991), II.XI and IV.Xiy. All further references to the Essay wiU be included in
the text and cited by book, chapter, and paragraph number.
^ See, for instance, John Dunn, 7?>e Political Thought of John Locke (Cambridge: Cambridge
Univereity, 1969) and David Wpoton's introduction tp Divine Right and IJemocraty: An
Anthology of Political Writing in Stuart England, (Bungay: Penguin, 1986), 41r2 both of which
support this estirnation of the centrdky pf Calvinist religious elements to Locke's political
thoiight. For a powerful, if excessive, attack ppon this appraisal, see Leo Strauss, Natural
Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicagq, 1953). Strauss argues that Locke's
apparent religiosity is a 4isingenuous attempt to make Hobbes more palatable, and that a
careful reading of his discussions of the law of nature reveals that sjxicke pannot have
recognized any law of nature in the proper sense of the term" ^Natural Right, 220). The
theoretical justifipation for this viqlent resolution of
paradoxes arid contradictions of
locke's discussions is foiind in Strairss's extreme version of the hermeneutics of suspicion.
For this last, see Strauss, Persecution and the Art (f Writing (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1952).
While Locke's own paranoia and secrecy concerning the authorship of the Treatises
encourages such an impatient reading, it may prove more helpful to consider the significance
pf Locke's paradoxes as such than to attempt, perhaps prematurely, to resolve them.
' Johti Colman argues that though Locke's doctrine retains the role of the deity, his rejeaion
of any sort of "theological voluntarist" position makes reason the rule in moral thought {John
Locke's Moral Philosophy [Edinburgh: Edinburgh University, 1983], 237). Richard Aaron, on
the other hand, insists that "Locke would prefer to give up the law of nature than to deny
the omnipotency of God" (John Locke, 2nd Edition [Oxford: Clarendon, 1955], 266).
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Punishment" (I.III.12) that takes the form of "Pleasure or Pain"
(ILXXVIII.5)/ Locke, however, does not accept Hobbes's voluntar
ism, as "God himself cannot choose what is not good" (II.XXI.49).
Though God's will is thus aligned with reason, it does not follow that
it can be known in full; indeed, Locke's chimerical hopes for a
Newtonian moral science remain unfulfilled, replaced by the less
ambitious supplementation of reason by revelation of the ironically
titled Reasonableness of Christianity} Hence the interpretation of the
law of nature that expresses God's will can never be circumvented by
autodidactic reason.^
In explicating the interpretation of this law, Locke runs into his
most serious difficulties when he is forced to explain how it could be
both inherent in human nature and capable of being misunderstood
or confused. In a single section of the second treatise Locke can assert
that the law of nature is "plain and intelligible to all rational
Creatures" and that the state of nature "wants an establish'd, settled,
known Law, received and allowed by common consent to be the
Standard of Right and Wrong" (II, 124). His occasional answer to this
dilemma is that violators have in some way renounced or lost their
rationality, and with it their humanity. As early as 1667, in the Essay
Concerning Toleration, he describes the immoral man as "one of the
more dangerous sorts of wild beasts, and so incapable of all society."'"
In the Treatises Locke avails himself of this vocabulary repeatedly, and
writes movingly of the bestial nature of the immoral man, who like
a "Wolf" "Lyon," "Tyger," or other "Beasts of Prey" must be hunted
down for the safety of the community from which he has set himself
apart (II, 11 and 16).
' That the notion of a moral law (and therefore the concepts of obedience and duty) are
incomprehensible without a lawgiver has more recently and systematically been argued by
G. E. M. Anscombe in "Modern Moral Philosophy," Ethics, Religion and Politics: The
Collected Philosophical Papers of G. E. M. Anscombe (Minneapolis; University of Minnesota,
1981).
® Locke announces his hopes that "morality is capable 0/ demonstration" in the eleventh
chapter of the third book of the Essay; he repudiates them in The Reasonableness of
Christianity, ed. I. T. Ramsey, (Stanford; Stanford University, 1958), 60-61.
' Compare Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N.K. Smith (New York; Macmillan, 1929),
644 and Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, 2nd ed., trans. L. W. Beck (Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice Hall, 1990), 24-5.
Cited in Divine, 59.
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This imagery invites a comparison with the first book of
Aristotle's Politics, where the autarkic man incapable of being ruled
in his turn is said to be "either a beast or a god" (I.II.14). Aristotle
introduces this language in the course of aiguing, first, that man is by
nature intended for political association; and, second, that Plato's
equation of the function of the statesman and that of the head of a
household denies the fundamental equality that characterizes such
association." Locke begins the second treatise in similar fashion by
distinguishing between political and private power (such as that of a
father) so as to prove against Filmer that the rule of kings such as
Charles and James Stuart is "that of Beasts" because it is based on
violence and not the equality of reason (II, 1)."
While Aristotle's political teleology is one that Locke's modern
individualism might seem to prohibit, there are similarities here as
well; Locke does think that men are destined by God and nature to
form social associations (II, 77). The difference between them is that
Aristotle sees our participation in the polis as the realization of our
nature as reasoning, speaking animals. The habitual attunement to
virtue that he seeks is best—if not only—possible in a just polis. Hence
the Nicomachean Ethics concludes with an assertion of the necessity
of the Politics, Locke on the other hand reveals the influence of
Newton in demanding an external cause for the compact; this is
required because our mercantile nature is fulfilled in a peaceable state
of nature as well as it is in a body politic." None of the "interests"
that Locke's commonwealth advances can properly be said to
represent the realization of dormant capacities: "Civil interests I call
life, liberty, health, and the indolency of body; and the possession of
outward things."" Lacking an explanation of how the human social
"inclination" (II, 77) will alone lead to the formation of the polity,
Locke introduces the threat of the immoral beast, Aristotle speaks of
" Compare Aristotle, Politics, I.i.2 and Plato, Statesman, 258e.
" And see II, 93. Filmer questions Aristotle's ability, as a heathen philosopher, to discern the
true paternal and biblical basis pf political authority in his Observations Upon Aristotle's
Pqlitiques. Locke, who cites this piece specifically, maintains that "A young man should begin
with Aristotle and then read the moderns if he please" (cited by Laslett in his introduction
to the Tivo Treatises, 103, note 54).
In Aristotelian terrns we might say that Locke emphasizes the efficient cause of the pohty
to the neglect of its final cause.
" John Locke, "Letter Concerning Toleration" in John Locke on Toleration and the Unity of
God, ed. Mario Montuori (Amsterdam; Gieben, 1983), 15.
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beasts in order to emphasize that such men have failed to fulfill their
nature. Locke in contrast means such language to inspire his readers
with a more lively horror at the prospect of such men, and a
corresponding sense of the necessity of political association; One of
the drawbacks of the state of nature is that such animals are not
systematically put down. This difference—which we might
characterize as one between necessity and inevitability—is registered
in the contrast between Aristotle's relatively tame "beast" and Locke's
vivid and oft-repeated "Wolf and "Tyger."^^
This rhetoric points to a broader problem in Locke's moral
theory: If a man loses his humanity with his integrity, the problem
of moral incontinence would seem to evaporate. Rabid dogs are not
said to be immoral. Locke speaks of criminals as wild animals in the
way that he does in part because he assumes that adequate moral
knowledge or belief can be grasped by all who reach for it.'^ This
makes it almost impossible to understand human immorality.
Corresponding to this difficulty is a tension within Locke's writings:
The self-evidence that he attributes to the law of nature in the
Treatises is difficult to square with the rest of his work, particularly
the first book of the Essay. If, as Locke argues, the mind is a blank
slate at birth, how can the precepts of natural law be known to it, or
be "writ in the Hearts of all Mankind" (II, 11), as he claims in the
Treatises that they are? Indeed, in the Essay Locke himself repeatedly
uses this very language to categorically deny that moral principles are
innate ideas or "natural Characters ingraven on the Mind" (I.II.l).'^
Locke's imagination pictures such "dangerous and noxious creatures'* (II, 16) as vividly as
it does in part because he places himself and us in a state of nature, where we are vulnerable
to them—and in part because he uses this rhetoric to condemn contemporary rulers, an
ideological design that is absent in Aristotle.
In The Reasonableness of Christianity he acknowledges that most men cannot attain
knowledge of moral truths, as they are incapable of following the arcane arguments of the
philosophers. Such men must rest instead with faith or, as he puts it in the Essay^ judgment
(IV.XIV).
And see the early Questions Concerning the Law of Nature^ trans, and ed. Horowitz, Clay,
and Clay (London: Cornell, 1990), 139-52, where Locke also explicitly denies that the law
of nature has been inscribed in the minds of men. Not only is the immediate agreement that
must, according to Locke, attend such innate knowledge lacking—"some recognize a different
law of nature, others none, all recognize that it is obscure" (141)—but the barbarous behavior
of savages, whom one would expect to live closest to nature and its laws, reveals humanity's
initial ignorance of these lasiv^. Here, as later, Locke falls back upon vague recommendations
of the knowledge of God and his laws that we are to glean from the rational interpretation
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His confident distinction between theories of innate moral laws and
of the natural law notwithstanding (I.III.13), the theory of natural law
set forth in his second treatise entangles him in the very paradox that
leads him to reject innate ideas in the Essay:
If Men have these innate, impressed Truths Originally, and
before the use of Reason, and yet are always ignorant of them,
till they come to the use of Reason, 'tis in effect to say, that
Men know, and know them not at the same time. (1.11.9)
To some extent this is, as critics from Sir Leslie Stephen on have
argued, nothing more than a straightforward contradiction on Locke's
part. On the one hand he is concerned to establish the primacy of
human freedom, both intellectual and political; on the other, he
wants to guarantee that that freedom not collapse into anarchy.
Hence he requires both the presence and the absence of a law of
nature. This results in an unresolved vacillation in the Treatises'
conceptualization of freedom, one that exactly replicates the
equivocation we noted above in his account of divine will. In §57 of
the second treatise Locke defines freedom as behavior in accordance
with the '^Law of Reason," a law that "is not so much the Limitation
as the direction of a free and intelligent Agent to his proper Interest."
On this account freedom is not constrained by the law as much as it
is the matter that is given form by the law. Law is thus a constitutive
part of free activity. Locke here reveals the influence of the Calvinist
doctrine of stat pro ratione voluntas, the identity of will and reason;
and he anticipates Kant, who argues in his mature work that freedom
is nothing but the ability to obey one's own law, and that morality
is not an external measure but is instead the very form of Practical
Reason.'^ But the discussion of the limits of paternalism that
of the evidence of the senses. It is significant for the present discussion that Locke here
touches upon familiar paradoxes, as when he asserts that the "light of nature" which
illuminates virtue and truth itself "lies hidden in the dark" (153).
" Important differences remain. Isaiah Berlin argues that in passages such as this Locke
advances a "positive" conception of freedom as "self-mastery" ("Two Concepts of Liberty,"
in Four Essays on Liberty [New York: Oxford University, 1969], 147). But this exaggerates the
similarity between Kant and Locke. In the process of arguing for the symbiotic unity of
freedom and the law, Kant completely divorces the moral law from prudential and
eudaemonistic teleology. It thus makes sense to claim that he understands freedom in the
"positive" sense of one's realization of one's capacities as a rational/moral agent, and not in
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immediately follows this definition reverts to describing freedom in
terms of the absence of law, as if the two were opposed: "When he
has acquired [the state of maturity], he is presumed to know how far
that Law [of nature] is to be his Guide, and how far he may make use
of his Freedom, and so comes to have it" (II, 59)."
This ambiguity runs through the Essay as well. At points Locke
follows Hobbes in arguing that the will is neither free nor
constrained, and that true freedom is found in the absence of external
constraint: "For how can we think anyone freer than to have the
power to do what he will?" (ILXXL21).^° But in his discussion of the
proper determination of the will by the judgment Locke turns away
from such a strictly "negative" account of the nature of freedom:
If to break loose from the conduct of Reason, and to want that
restraint of Examination and Judgment, which keeps us from
chusing or doing the worse, be Liberty, true Liberty, mad Men
and Fools are the only Freemen. (ILXXL50)
Locke never manages to reconcile these conflicting accounts of law
and freedom in the manner of Rousseau, who distinguishes between
natural and moral freedom. To do so would require a more complex
moral psychology than Locke's work, on the face of it, manifests.
Rousseau's bipartite theory of liberty has the effect of insisting upon
the human ability to transcend our present nature, one that is illsuited for our social lives, and develop a second, higher, nature,
Rousseau thus takes steps towards the transfiguration of nature into
history that properly begins in Kant's late political essays. Locke does
not consider such an eschatological theory, and instead bases his
political philosophy upon a distinction between natural and municipal
the "negative" terms of the absence of constraint upon our desires. But Locke argues that
"Freedom is not, as we are told, A Liberty for
Man to do what he lists^ on the grounds
that freedom is the achievement of one's "Interest"—not of one's capacities. Hence he can
assert in the samg section from which I have bepn quoting (II, 57), "Could they be happier
without it, the Law, as a useless thing would of it self vanish."
This second account of freedom is the more prevalent in the Jwg Treatises. Hence in
paragraph 123 of the second Treatise Locke gsks, "If Man jn the State of Nature be so
free...why wjll he part with his Freedom by entering civil society?"
It will be noted that this passage almost exactly contradicts §57 pf the second Treatise, cited
in nl7.
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law in which the former, far from being transcended, serves as the
foundation and guide of the latter (II, 12).
But though the natural law is not simply transcended, it is to make
up for its inadequacies that the municipal laws are called forth. In a
paradoxical fashion, then, the natural law must sanction its own
supplementation. This relationship raises a number of questions
concerning the function of the law of nature in the foundation of the
political judge, a foundation that has both a diachronic and a
synchronic side. As regards the first, we need to ask what role is
played by the law of nature in the mythical history of the foundation
of the polity that will succeed the state of nature. Why does this law
fail to preserve the harmony of the state of nature.^ And how will its
shortcomings be overcome in the post-contractual world? As regards
the second, we must inquire into the justificatory basis of the
legislator's judgment. How can his judgments transcend the private
realm and align the natural and municipal laws?

One striking feature of Locke's account of our passage out of the state
of nature is the quality of the change involved. Locke's state of nature
is distinguished by the presence of all the virtues that had once been
the hard-won fruits of politics. Where Spinoza and Hobbes argue that
men can only be the agents and subjects of a moral vocabulary within
the particular community their contract forms, Locke blithely
declares that both "truth and keeping of Faith belongs to Men, as
Men, and not as Members of Society" (II, 14). In an influential
critique and criticism of apolitical liberalism, Sheldon Wolin has
attacked Locke for this easy assumption. On Wolin's view, political
theory has traditionally involved the architectonic attempt to
construct a communal life. Locke is a "pivotal figure" because he
represents a decisive break with this tradition in favor of a
sociological approach to our common life.^' According to Wolin
Locke accomplishes this break "by reading back into the state of
nature a benign political condition having all of the idealized marks
" Sheldon S. Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuity and Change in Western Political Thought
(Boston; Little, Brown and Company, 1960), 293.
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of a political society and none of its drawbacks."^^ By naturalizing
politics in this way, Locke invents the anti-political notion of
"society." Invoking the social to unconsciously do the work of the
political, Locke has rendered political action into a matter of
"restoration rather than innovation."^'
While this is an elegant characterization of the liberal conception
of politics, Wolin's attack upon Locke in particular is not nuanced
enough. This comes out in his evaluation of Locke's account of our
passage out of the state of nature. Because Wolin believes that the
Lockeian state of nature "by definition has no 'inconveniences'" he is
committed to the view that it makes no sense to attempt to derive the
social compact from the state of nature. Instead we are led into the
contract from "a third condition, one distinct from what [Locke]
called 'the perfect state of nature' and the state of war...the fallen state
of nature." Wolin claims to find his evidence for this state in the
"ominous" language "which [Locke] employed in preparing a plausible
context for the contract.
However, Locke's ominous language is
not nearly so exclusively used here as he suggests; As early as
paragraph 13—before he begins his discussion of the state of
war—Locke speaks of the infamous "Inconveniences of the State of
Nature"; and as late as paragraph 123 he writes of this state as being
"full of fears and continual dangers."
Moreover, there is a basic conceptual problem with Wolin's
solution. His imposition of a third state which Locke himself never
mentions does nothing to explain what is most obscure, which is why
there were ever any changes at all in the state of nature. If the state
of nature lacked any moral improprieties or inconveniences, it is
wholly unclear why it would be any more likely to produce an
"imperfect state of nature" than a state of war and thence of civil
Vision J 305.
I refer to the unconscious work of society advisedly; The notion that society is a drowsing
being whose dreams need to be interpreted, and which being itself needs to be awoken, is a
prized one in the philosophical tradition of the west. One can perceive this idea at work in
philosophers as various as Rousseau and Wittgenstein, both of whom see the role of
philosophy as that of saying or showing what society knows but cannot make present to
itself. This picture of philosophy in turn owes obvious debts to the Platonic doctrine of
anamnesis. For a critique of the idea of (political) philosophy as recovery or mimesis that
subsumes the creative political impulse so prized by Wolin, see Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe,
Heidegger, Art and Politics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990).
Vision, 307.
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society. The answer to the riddle is that the state of nature was always
unstable. It is not some inferred third state that is to blame; it is the
confusion of nature. If Locke has naturalized politics, it is only
because he politicizes nature.^^
The state of nature as Locke describes it was never the idyllic
setting that, say, Rousseau's state of nature in the Second Discourse
was. While Rousseau in that text has to appeal to miracles to explain
our fall into society, Locke has no such difficulties. As noted above,
the Lockeian state of nature obtains whenever men lack "a common
Judge with Authority" (II, 19); that is, when each person judges in his
or her own case, and there is no public judge with the power and the
authority to enforce its decisions.^^ Locke all but identifies the
inconveniences of the state of nature with this diversity of judgment:
"the Inconveniences of the State of Nature...must certainly be Great,
where Men be Judges in their own Case" (II, 13). His tendency to
exaggerate the beast in the criminal notwithstanding, Locke, when he
discusses the necessity of municipal government, is quite clear that
this authoritative judge is not needed merely to protect the innocent
from the evil or depraved. Men of good will can also misunderstand
the law of nature. Indeed, it would be a mistake to draw too sharp a
distinction here; Locke's rationalism may not be wholehearted, but
it is strong enough that he would accept the implication that our
humanity is in some way compromised when, by neglecting to study
the law of nature, we misunderstand it.
There are various reasons we might misinterpret this law: For
though the Law of Nature be plain and intelligible to all
rational Creatures, yet Men, being biassed by their Interest, as
well as ignorant for want of study of it, are not apt to allow of
it as a Law binding to them in the application of it to their
particular Cases. (II, 124)
It is a sign of how little his readers share Locke's faith in moral
education—the faith that motivates the Essay (1.1.6-7)—that most of
Wolin, of course, denies this. But even he seems to have little faith in his denial: a page
before he makes this claim he openly contradicts himself and writes that this state was
"marred only by 'inconveniences'" {Vision, 306).
It is significant that Rousseau adopts the same view when he comes to develop his own
contract theory.
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them have read him as if he attributed the problems of politics only
to the first of these, the bias of interest.^^ However, Locke clearly
states that, though the self-evidence of the law of nature for everyone
but children and idiots ought to serve to guarantee harmony in the
"community of nature," people can, for want of studying the selfevident, be honestly wrong about its dictates. A later discussion of the
inadequacies of the law of nature that does not explicitly mention
study reiterates this:
For the Law of Nature being unwritten, and so no where to be
found but in the minds of Men, they who through Passion or
Interest shall mis-cite, or misapply it, cannot easily be
convinced of their mistake where there is no establish'd Judge
[and] every one is Judge, Interpreter, and Executioner of it. (II,
136)
Here both passion and interest are relevant only in so far as they lead
to errors in the citation, application, and interpretation of the law of
nature. Full as much as the untoward influence of passion, it is this
interpretive confusion which serves to disrupt natural harmony.
The constancy of the threat of this disruption is hard to square
with Locke's confident description of the perspicuous character of the
law of nature. He assures his readers that this law is "as intelligible
and plain to a rational Creature, and to a Studier of that Law, as the
positive Laws of Common-wealths, nay possibly plainer" (II, 12). But
if the law of nature is clearer than mere municipal laws, how can the
establishment of such latter laws in the person of a common judge
erase the inconveniences of the state of nature? The answer would
seem to be that the interpretations of the magistrate will be consistent
and enforced. That this is not Locke's intention is indicated in his
fullest discussion of the inadequacies of the state of nature, in which
the judge's inability to enforce his interpretations of the law of nature
is put on a par with the absences of an authoritative judge and a
recognized (interpretation of the natural) law (II, 124-126). Moreover,
this would suggest that the law of nature can only be salvaged from
They thus conflate Locke's position with that of Hobbes, who argues in the Leviathan that
"the unwritten Law of Nature" is clear to all who are not "blinded by self love, or some
other passion" (322).
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the violence of the state of war by virtue of force. It then becomes
difficult to see what will distinguish this enforced law from the rule
of violence. If we are to conclude with a state that rules by the
consent of the governed, the subjects of the magistrate must approve
of his interpretations. But as we have already found them to be
unable to consistently agree upon the correct interpretation of the law
of nature, it is unclear on what grounds they will base this approval.
This would make Locke a Hobbesian, not, as Strauss has argued, on
account of his veiled nihilism, but by virtue of his inability to
articulate a coherent alternative to the arbitrary rule of a judgment no
more public in nature than any other.
Locke's solution to this quandary is to propose the law of nature,
not as a sufficient standard in itself, but as a rule of interpretation for
the enforced decisions of the magistrate.
The law of nature stands as an eternal rule to all men.
Legislators as well as others. The Rules that they make for other
Mens Actions, must, as well as their own and other Mens
Actions, be conformable to the Law of Nature, i.e. to the Will
of God. (II, 135)^^
But as the law of nature is not able to interpret itself, and as we are
unable to agree upon its interpretation, a "rule" must likewise be
found for its explication. While the precise nature of this interpretive
rule is not yet clear, its probable fate is: Even if such a rule is found
it may be too limited in scope to provide any true security. When the
state has been established, "there can be no judge on earth" to
adjudicate between the people, the legislative power, and the
executive. In the case of an attempt to enslave them being made by
either branch of the government, "the People have no other remedy
in this, as in all other cases where they have no Judge on Earth, but
to appeal to Heaven" (II, 168). Heaven already having disappointed
them by providing them with an ineffective law of nature, one guesses
" It is true that this sentence goes on to refer to a utilitarian standard that might seem to
short-cut the difficult interpretation of the will of God; "and the fundamental Law of Nature
[is] the preservation of Mankind.' But this phrasing also specifically acknowledges the existence
of other, less fundamental, laws of nature.
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that the people will appeal to force instead.^' This threatened collapse
of the morally sanctioned political order is connected to Locke's
tendency of associating the irrational and hence unnatural man with
the eminently natural beasts. If the state of nature is one in which we
are both vulnerable to unnatural, irrational men and governed by the
rational law, then nature appears at once as the realm of reason and
unreason, or, as Locke also figures it, reason and force. Likewise, by
the logic of Locke's vocabulary of reason, nature, and force, his judge
appears as the spokesman for nature, and its law of reason; yet his
function comes into play only when reason no longer obtains, and
relations between men have come to be determined by force.

I have argued that Locke presents the uncertainties of political
judgment as a function of problems in the interpretation of the law
of nature. On this account our difficulty would be that of consistently
and correctly construing God's intentions, in that the law, as written
upon us by God, is best understood by reference to the intentions He
pursues in its promulgation. Locke at times suggests just such an
approach, as for instance when he refers to "that great Law of Nature,
Who so sheddeth Mans Blood, by Man shall his Blood be shed." This law,
Locke finds, is clear to all, "so plain was it writ in the Hearts of all
mankind" (II, 11). There are good reasons to be skeptical about the
significance of this phrasing. For one thing, as noted above, Locke in
the Essay explicitly and repeatedly denies that moral laws can be said
to lie "open as natural Characters ingraven on the Mind." For
another, this way of characterizing moral judgment is hardly unique
to Locke. Locke's "judicious Hooker" represents the Thomistic
doctrine of the lex aetema in a form that suggests a similar
understanding of reason as the natural law. Similarly, Pierre
Gassendi—from whom Locke derived both so much of his empiricist
reservations about Descartes and his Christianized Epicurianism—also
writes of moral laws being "imprinted in the hearts of all men" by
Indeed, the phrase '^appeal to Heaven* is an ironic code in the Treatises for violent rebellion;
see for instance II, 168.
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God.^° No doubt all three adopted this highly conventional figure
from the Bible. It is found in Jeremiah:
But this shall be the covenant that I will make with the house
of Israel; After those days, saith the Lord, I will put my law
in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts; and will be
their God, and they shall be my people. (31:33)
And more significantly, given Locke's interest in the Pauline epistles,
in Romans-.
For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature
the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are
a law unto themselves: Which show the work of the law
written in their hearts. (2:15)
However, neither the evident contradiction nor the conventionality
imply that Locke's use of this language is irrelevant; the real
significance of this metaphor of inscription is its instantiation in the
conceptual structure of Lxjcke's treatment of the natural law. It is the
fact that Locke's understanding of the instability of the state of nature
takes this problem to be one of interpretation that gives force to his
use of the metaphor of inscription, not the other way around.
Locke assures us that "Reason, which is [the law of nature] teaches
all Mankind who will but consult it" the duties proper to them (II,
6). This consultation, as noted above, takes the form of study (II, 12).
To avoid the evident circularity of a rational creature needing to
study a law which is identified as reason we should have to expand
upon the notion of study referred to here. What is it that the rational
man learns by studying the moral law of reason? What does this
study involve? The point here is not that such passages reveal Locke
to be hopelessly logocentric—though their insistence upon the selfevident quality of a law that is seen, if only metaphorically, as written
(and hence circulated, not self-evident) may well do so. I should rather
make the more modest observation that Locke figures our knowledge
of the moral law of nature in hermeneutic terms, terms that invite
Pierre Gassendi, "Three Discounes of Happiness, Virtue, and Liberty," in Moral Philosophy
From Montaigne to Kant, ed. J. B. Schneewind {New York: Cambridge University, 1990), 366.
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comparison with his explicitly interpretive writings. Indeed, it is
Locke himself who supplies us with a philosophico-literary theory
within which to understand his political writings.
Locke's fullest discussion of the nature of interpretation is found
in the preface to his Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St. Paul,
the suggestively titled "Essay for the Understanding of St. Paul's Epistles,
by Consulting St. Paul Himself This piece has not received a great
deal of critical attention. It has been mentioned in and at times been
the occasion of various religious treatises.'' It has been noted as an
exercise in literary criticism of some originality." And it has been
praised in mild terms for its insights and its common sense."
However, as an explication of what is involved in the interpretation
of a text, the piece is less clear than this commentary might suggest.
Moreover, a number of its lacunae parallel those found in the Two
Treatises. There, as we have noted, Locke attempts to explicate the
workings of the rule of the rational natural law by which men make
moral and political judgments. In his Paraphrase Locke suggests
another rule, in this case one by which to determine which
interpretation of the apostle's writings to trust. Such a rule is
necessary, according to Locke, for without it interpretation is useless
to help us understand the text; Locke writes that until we establish
such a rule the writings of the Apostle's interpreters "serve for the
most part to no other Use, but either to make us find our own Sense, and
his in St. Paul's Words; or else to find in them no settled Sense at all."^^
For example, Robert Jenkin, Remarks on Some Books Lately Published, viz. Mr. Basnage's
History of the Jews, Whiston's Eight Sermons, Lock's Paraphrases and Notes on St. Paul's Epistles,
Le Clerc's Bihliotheque Choisie (London: 1709), 117-73; Benjamin Coole, Some Brief
Observations on the Paraphrase and Notes Of the Judicious John Locke: Relating to the Women's
Exercising Their Spiritual gifts in the Church (London: 1716); John Napleton, Advice to a
Student in the University, Concerning the Qualifications and Duties of a Minister of the Gospel
in the Church of England (Oxford: 1795); ''Remarks on Mr. Locke's Paraphrase and Notes on
St. Paul's Epistles" in A Discourse concerning Faith as the Condition of the Gospel Covenant
(George-Town: 1796); and William Rawes, The Gospel Ministry of Women (London: 1801).
Gretchen Pahl, "John Locke as a Literary Critic and Biblical Interpreter" in Essays Critical
and Historical, Dedicated to Lily B. Campbell (Berkeley: University of California, 1950),
139-57.
John Yolton, Locke: An Introduction (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), 1; and Grant,
Locke's Liberalism, 8.
*'An Essay for the Understanding of St. Paul's Epistles, by Consulting St Paul Himself" Locke's
Preface to A Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St. Paul to the Galatians, 1 and 2
Corinthians, Romans, Ephesians, ed. Arthur Wainwright (New York: Clarendon, 1987), 109.
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This discussion is expanded upon elsewhere in the piece, when Locke
characterizes the twin dangers of interpretation in terms that suggest
the political dangers that inhere to interest politics and pure
democracy. Without the interpretive rule he seeks, Locke warns us
that we shall
either consult only those who have the good luck to he thought
sound and Orthodox, avoiding those of different Sentiments from
themselves in the great and approved Points of their Systems, as
dangerous and not fit to he medled with; or else with Indifferency
look into the Notes of all Commentators promiscuously^^
The first of these produces readings that are blindly doctrinaire, and
the second readers that are so distracted that they are left bewildered,
with no interpretation or ideas at all.
Locke qualifies his faith in his proposed rule by suggesting that
"others" must judge whether it performs properly. For his own part
Locke is satisfied, not because of any inherent property of the rule
itself, or even of the reading it allows for, but rather because certain
"experts" have reacted favorably to it. This suggestion that the rule is
best judged by men whose understanding of the text precedes their
experience of the rule certainly renders Locke's achievement more
modest than it at first appears. If anything, Locke can only claim to
have rendered the reading habits of authorities in a more systematic
fashion, thereby allowing for their propagation to non-specialists.
Moreover, the function of this rule is little short of paradoxical.
Locke argues that it is only with an understanding of the whole text
that one can adequately address interpretive difficulties generated by
specific passages. We are therefore encouraged to break into the
hermeneutic circle by repeatedly reading through the text in its
entirety, ignoring the conventional divisions and assuming that the
text's meaning constitutes a consistent totality.
I saw plainly, after I hegan once to reflect on it, that if any one
now should write me a Letter, as long as St. Paul's to the
Romans, concerning such a Matter as that is, in a Stile as Foreign,
and Expressions as dubious as his seem to he, if I should divide it
Preface, A Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St Paul^ 108.
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into fifteen or sixteen Chapters, and read them one to day, and
another tomorrow, etc. it was ten to one I should never come to
a full and clear Comprehension of it. The way to understand the
Mind of him that writ it, every one would agree, was to read the
whole Letter through from one end to the other, all at once, to see
what was the main Subject and Tendency of it.^^

Only those passages that defy incorporation into the whole after such
repeated attempts can be said to indicate true diversions from the
central aim of the text. Locke's desire here to clarify Paul's epistles by
treating each one as a unity is quite a bit more extreme than the
merely commonsensical practice of putting the burden of proof on
those who would find contradictions between the different parts of
any one of the Saint's epistles.^^ Indeed, Locke takes the idea of the
epistle's identity almost literally, and considers it altogether
"necessary" for the proper understanding of any one of the letters that
the reader "read it all through at one Siting as if its meaning were to
be lost as soon as even temporal divisions were begun upon the text.''
The totality and coherence of the text is thus both assumed (if only
to be disproved) and enacted.
This concern with the epistle's unity suggests a parallel with the
Essay's discussion of the epistemic primacy of the non-divisible
identity of simple objects. Locke argues there that "there is nothing
can be plainer to a Man, than the clear and distinct Perception he has
of those simple Ideas; which being each in itself uncompounded,
contains in it nothing but one uniform Appearance, or Conception in
the mind, and is not distinguishable into different Ideas" (II.II.l). That
is, the clarity and distinctness of our simple ideas is in part a function
of the unity of those ideas. The other hallmark of a simple idea is that
of the mind's relative passivity towards it; it is not so much the
product of intelligence, as it is an experience of that intelligence. This
too, as the title of the epistolary preface announces, Locke seeks to
reclaim for the reader of Paul, a reader who struggles to efface
himself, and to accept the Apostle's meaning without the imposition
Preface, A Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St Paul, 109.
" This more humble aspiration is announced in The Reasonableness of Christianity, where
Locke argues that we must not "cull" scripture into verses or aphorisms "as if they were all
distinct and independent aphorisms" (Reasonableness, 71).
" Preface, A Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St Paul, 110.
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of his own. Of course, neither this passivity nor this assumption of
unity are capable of making a text into any sort of simple idea; texts
are more like complex ideas, in that they also "are, when the Mind
pleases, considered each by it self, as one entire thing, and signified by
one name" (II.VII.1). As we live in the fictional world of "beauty,"
"gratitude," and "men," so our Biblical reading postulates a fictional
unity to give meaning to our experience. Locke promises us that the
adoption of his hermeneutical method will allow us to achieve
knowledge of the unity that lies behind—or, better, is constitutive
of—Paul's epistles; in this case, that "one entire thing" is "signified by
one name": St. Paul. He goes so far as to assure us that with his
method he has succeeded in his efforts to "make St. Paul an Interpreter
to me of his own Epistles.
In the first Treatise Locke also speaks of
"the Scripture" being "the best interpreter" of the unclear phrases and
passages it contains (I, 25). Here, as there, his method is to transform
the meaning of the epistles in their entirety into the sought-after
"rule" or "standard" by which the particular parts of the epistles are
to be interpreted.
The most significant features of this paradox of Paul's silent selfinterpretation are mirrored in the Two Treatises, in Locke's
discussions of the very different "rule" of the law of nature. This law
he identifies with God-given "Reason, the common Rule and Measure
of mankind" (II, 11). In a passage that deserves to be quoted at length,
Locke writes.
The Law that was to govern Adam, was the same that was to
govern all his Posterity, the Law of reason. But this Off-spring
having another way of entrance into the World, different from
him, by a natural Birth, that produced them ignorant and
without the use of Reason, they were not presently under that
Law: for no Body can be under a Law, which is not
promulgated to him; and this Law being promulgated or made
known by Reason only, he that is not come to the Use of his
Reason, cannot be said to be under this Law. (II, 57)
Here we find a perfect replica of the circular explanation of Pauline
exegesis. Just as Paul paradoxically becomes his own interpreter, so
' Preface, A Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St Pauly 113.
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reason promulgates itself to man. The latter example seems if
anything even more explicitly contradictory: If men are rational, and
the law of nature is reason, as Locke assures us they are, why would
he go on to reintroduce reason in yet another guise, that of its own
explication? The parallel we now find with Locke's hermeneutics
suggests that the answer is that Locke figures this promulgation in
terms of our learning to "read" the law of nature which is at least at
times understood by Locke to be "writ in the Hearts of all Mankind."
As we must assume the consistency and coherence—indeed the
identity—of the textual Paul, so we must assume the validity of
"reason" if we are to see that very reason as a binding and universal
moral law, or even to understand its claims to be such. In each case
the interpretive process is structurally the same: the object to be
analyzed is split in two, with one twin functioning as the other's
interpretation.
This same paradox bedevils Locke's discussion of the relationship
of the universal natural law to the sundry municipal laws. The latter
is said to be the rule by which the laws of man are to be read, judged,
and "regulated and interpreted" (II, 12). It is, as it were, the moral
standard we are to apply to all legal systems. At least at points in the
second treatise Locke is confident that his law of nature, as reason, is
easy for all to understand, in contrast to the laws of men, which are
often only the "Phansies and intricate Contrivances of Men, following
contrary and hidden interests put into Words" (II, 12). As the
language here suggests, the "interests" that lie behind the law of
nature will, by contrast, be neither hidden nor contrary. These
interests will be those of God, the author of the law, and by virtue
of an almost Deistic harmony, those of his devout rational subjects.'*®
But Locke complicates matters by suggesting that even as the law
of nature functions as the rule for the evaluation of municipal law,
these latter laws are themselves only interpretations of the law of
nature: they are needed because of the tumult attendant upon the
state of nature, "where every one is Judge, Interpreter, and
Executioner" of the law of nature (II, 136). This puts us in the
awkward position of needing to interpret the law of nature in order
to evaluate interpretations of it. If this intermediate interpretive step
^ See in this regard §86 of the first Treatise^ where Locke identifies "Reason" as *^the Voice of
God in him."*
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were not required, if reason were actually present instead of merely
represented, it is unclear what the necessity for human laws would
rest upon. Once again Locke provides us with a rule that can only be
used when it is no longer necessary. In each case—that of reason,
scriptural interpretation, and here justice—Locke seeks a rule to guide
our conduct, and thereby render it free but purposeful. This generates
the same difficulty that Hume identified in his skeptical treatment of
the empiricist account of inferential judgment. Here too Locke relies
upon the guidance of a rule which cannot be justified until an
inference legislated by that rule has already been made—which, in
Hume's words, is "evidently going in a circle, and taking for granted,
that which is the very point in question."""
Locke, at times at least, figures the identification and use of the
rule of political judgment as an interpretive problem. This helps to
explain the paradoxical quality of the law of nature, its simultaneous
presence and absence. As a text it is there before us (or, as Locke
would have it, within us); but as its meaning requires our active
participation, it is always in the process of construction.''^ This in
turn renders Lockeian authority inherently unstable. As we have
noted, Locke identifies the seat of political power that the social
contract introduces with that of an impartial judge which can enforce
its choices between different interpretations of the law of nature.
Given the circular nature of the interpretive process, it is difficult to
see how such a judge can substantiate any given interpretation of that
law. Each "reading" threatens to collapse into an arbitrary exercise of
force, one that justifies itself by using its desired conclusion as an
interpretive guide in a viciously circular manner.

" Hume, Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and the Principles cf Morals, ed. L.A.
Selby-Bigge (Oxford; Oxford University, 1902), 2nd Edition, 36.
It is one of the great achievements of Kant's account of the moral will that it escapes this
dilemma of reference and production, relying instead upon the interaction between the will
as Wille and as Willkur. See Lewis White Beck, A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical
Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1960), 176ff. Unfortunately, this is achieved at the
cost of the ability to account for political or rational plurality.
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To say that Locke's political thought incorporates a hermeneutic
element might suggest that he is best read as a latter-day Thomist
natural law theorist. However, it is precisely because of the central
and peculiar role played by the natural law in his thought that Locke
is better read as pointing ahead, towards the confluence of political
and aesthetic theory that centers around Kant's Critique of Judgment.
The main connection here is Locke's fundamental concern with rules,
and the difficulties this entails for him. Locke consistently looks for
rules that might govern our thought and conduct. Rules are needed
when we read the Bible, and it is in search of standing laws that men
enter into political association. This does not mean that the absence
of such association entails a lack of such rules, as the state of nature
is of course governed by its own law. Even the Lyons and Tygers that
drive men out of this state do not lack a rule of conduct; such men
have only chosen "to live by another Rule, than that of reason and
common Equity" (II, 8 and 1). Evil itself is cast as rule-governed:
Because he identifies coherence itself with the governance of rules,
Locke is all but unable to conceive of true anarchy, the lack of an
arche or rule.''^
It is true that Locke does allow for the legitimate exercise of
executive prerogative, which he defines most suggestively as ''doing
good without a Rule"" (II, 166). However, this prerogative is subject to
a number of severe limitations. To begin with, it is confined to
relatively trivial matters; "If a Controversie arise betwixt a Prince
and some of the People, in a matter where the Law is silent, or
doubtful, and the thing be of great Consequence, I should think the
proper f/mpire...should be the Body of the People" (II, 242).
Prerogative is also said by Locke to be sanctioned by and even
identical to the "Fundamental Law of Nature" that demands the
preservation of the majority of the community and its public good
(II, 159 and 134). Moreover, Locke assures us that it must fulfill the
spirit, if not the "Letter," of the law of the legislature (II, 164). Indeed,
a careful examination of the arguments Locke advances in justification
of executive prerogative makes it clear that the executive does not in
his view have the right or power to act in defiance of the law except
This is not to say that Locke believes that reason, justice, or evil can be taught thorough
the simple promulgation of a rule. Practice is necessary for each of these. See Peter A.
Schools, Reasoned Freedom: John Locke arui the Enlightenment (London: Cornell University,
1992), 31ff.
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in situations where the legislature is either not in session or has
granted discretionary authority to the executive—authority which it
may recall at its pleasure/'' Such concessions are necessary if Locke
is to maintain any consistency with his repeated insistence that a
legitimate commonwealth is one ruled by standing laws; '^against the
Laws there can he no Authority (II, 206; and see II, 222 and 232).
Without these references to the laws that ultimately sanction and
govern executive prerogative, Locke's prerogative would cut all ties
with his natural law, and base itself entirely upon utilitarian
considerations.^^ As in Hume's "Of the Original Contract," the basis
of political obligation would be found in neither natural law nor the
original compact, but in the individual's calculation of his own
interest. Similarly, Locke's allowance that certain "God-like Princes"
have some claim to "Arbitrary Power" (II, 166) is clearly contradicted
by his argument that the rule of a prince's "Arbitrary Power" puts his
subjects into a state of war with him (II, 222). And the latter
argument plays a fundamental role in Locke's political theory. By
virtue of its deep concern with both law and consent, the second
treatise is far indeed from Plato's Statesman, which rejects the
necessity of either to just government (296d-e).
This concern with rules is not peculiar to Locke, who merely
enunciates in his own terms a distrust of prudential wisdom that is
definitive of modernity. The .modern attempt to replace phronesis with
** Grant, John Locke's Liberalism, 83-98 provides a helpful discussion of this issue; but I am
particularly indebted here to Thomas S. Langston and Michael E. Lind, "John Locke and the
Limits of Presidential Prerogative," 24 Polity, 2 (1991), 49-68. Their discussion is enhanced
by their painstaking consideration of the different examples to which Locke appeals in
illustration of his doctrine, as well as their ability to distinguish between different modes of
Lockeian prerogative. As they note, John Dunn does not make such distinctions, which may
in part account for his emphasis upon the extra-legal political virtue of trust in the
interpretation of Locke. Compare Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke, 150-51 and
"The Concept of 'Trust' in the Politics of John Locke," in Philosophy in History, eds, Rorty,
Schneewind, and Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1984).
® The contrast of Locke's mixed political theory with Utilitarianism should not be taken to
suggest that the latter is at odds with legalism. Utilitarianism began by sloughing off the
"nonsense upon stilts" of Bentham's reviled natural law theory. But conflicts with common
intuitions about justice have left few "Act-Utilitarians" in the field, most retreating to some
form or other of "Rule-Utilitarianism." On a more fundamental level, the use of the
utilitarian calculus can itself easily be shown to consist of "the application of a law to an
individual case" (Mill, "Utilitarianism," in Utilitarianism and Other Essays, ed. Alan Ryan
[London: Penguin, 1987], 274).
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the governance of impartial rules of arbitration leads to an aporia, the
specter of rules which cannot govern their own application. If justice
and reason are both identified in terms of impartial rules, how are we
to characterize the application of those rules? We are led into an
infinite regress if every application requires in turn the guidance of its
own rule; to escape it we seem driven to accept the injustice and
irrationality of the application of the rules of justice and reason. This
dilemma in part fuels the rise of both modern skepticism and modern
aesthetics. Montaigne initiates modern skepticism in precisely these
terms, and concludes that knowledge, moral or otherwise, is not
forthcoming.''^ Modern aesthetics, on the other hand, embraces this
paradox, and attempts to describe the criteria that must be implicit in
judgments of taste, though they cannot be made explicit.'*'' The close
relation between these two developments is most evident in the
reflective, aesthetic judgment of Kant's third Critique: this is a mode
of judgment that Kant alleges escapes the purview of any rules capable
of expression, even as he persists in describing its functioning in terms
of rules.''® Cognitive judgments begin with a rule, under which the
particular is subsumed. In contrast, aesthetic judgments are said by
Kant to be reflective because they must devise a law for themselves
from particulars alone. In so doing they assume and express the sensus
communis aestheticus, the free play of the understanding and the
imagination. Such a rule-that-is-not-a-rule cannot be proven or
demonstrated, but is presented by Kant as a necessary presupposition
"in every logic and every principle of knowledge that is not one of
skepticism.'""
•" Montaigne, In Defense of Raymond Sehond (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1965), 117-118;
compare Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 177. Spinoza's doctrine that "truth is its own
standard" is formulated in response to this same threatened regress; see Ethics (New York:
Dover, 1955), XLIII, note. That Locke's political theory does not sufficiently acknowledge
the threat posed by skepticism to its own confident assumption of shared moral intuitions
is one reason that the author of the Essay was unable in his lifetime to acknowledge his own
authorship of the Treatises. Hobbes in contrast insists on beginning the Leviathan with a
rehearsal of a pointedly skeptical epistemology.
See Hume's deeply ambiguous "Of the Standard of Taste" in Hume's Ethical Writings, ed.
Alasdair Maclntyre (London: University of Notre Dame, 1965).
" Compare §§8 and 22 of Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgment (New York: Oxford
University, 1989).
The Critique of Judgment, §21.
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Locke does not sufficiently recognize the paradoxicality of his own
account of either reading or political reasoning to formulate such an
aporetic theory. Indeed, he would have been actively hostile to it. In
the Essay he expresses anxiety at a similar encroachment of taste into
what ought to be a cleaner and clearer application of the moral law.
When properly applied, Locke assures us, "Vertue" and "Vice" are
"coincident with the divine LawT However, he recognizes that
the measure of what is every where called and esteemed Vertue
and Vice is [the] approbation or dislike, praise or blame, which
by a secret and tacit consent establishes it self in the several
Societies, tribes, and Clubs of Men of the World....For though
Men uniting into politick Societies, have resigned up to the
publick the disposing of all their Force...yet they retain still the
power of Thinking well or ill. (II.XXVIII.IO)
The explicit rivalry of this moral taste with the divine and the
political laws is given force by the references to the associations it
forms through tacit consent.^" And, though Locke might bemoan this
usurpation, he himself participates in it;
And here we may see how it comes to pass, that a Man may
justly incur punishment....For though his will be always
determined by that, which is judg'd good by his
Understanding, yet it excuses him not: Because, by a too hasty
choice of his own making, he has imposed on himself wrong
measures of good and evil....He has vitiated his own Palate, and
must be answerable to himself for the sickness and death that
follows from it. (II.XXI.56)
This notion of a moral taste is at variance with Locke's theory of
natural law; yet in this variance there is a deeper kinship. Locke's
eudaemonistic attempt to found morality on pleasure and pain joins
with his over-riding concern with rules (ILXXVIIL5); together they
point beyond the natural law to a distinctively liberal conflation of
^ Though Locke denies that tacit consent can make one a citizen, he relies upon it to
establish both the institution of money (II, 36 and 50) and to justify the "insensible change"
by wbich the "natural Fathers of Families' became "the politick Monarchs' of their sons (II,
76).
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morality and taste. This conflation is not that of Aristotle, nor of
Locke's student Shaftesbury. Far from granting to taste, in Gadamer's
words, "an ideal normative element," both Locke's political theory
and his hermeneutics pose us on the horns of a dilemma, and ask us
to choose between objective rules and subjective chaos.The severity
and nature of this choice places Locke within the Hobbesian
tradition, where judgment only produces and never resolves political
disputes, and political justice is essentially procedural. Its irreality
allows us to see the attractions of Kant's aesthetics, which promise us
a community founded in the free exercise of a judgment that is
neither objective nor subjective, but properly public^ However,
though Locke may signal the need for such a development, he does
not himself participate in it. To move from interpretive to aesthetic
communities is thus to leave him behind.
Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: Crossroad, 1986), 38. I cite Gadamer here because
his is the best known version of the history of this subjectivisation of taste, hermeneutics, and
judgment. See Truth and Method, 4-90.

